UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

6-17-2014

State v. Brooks Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 41046

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"State v. Brooks Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 41046" (2014). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 4681.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/4681

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.

)
)

)
)
)
)

v.

NO. 41
CANYON
NO.CR

)

)
)

J.
District Judge

SARA B. THOMAS
State Appellate Public Defender
State of Idaho
I.S.B. #5867
ERIK R. LEHTINEN
Chief, Appellate Unit
I.S.B. #6247

KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal law Division
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
(208) 334-4534

BEN P. MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #8712
3050 N. lake Harbor lane, Suite 100
Boise, ID 83703
(208) 334-2712

ATTORNEYS FOR
DEFENDANT -APPELLANT

ATTORNEY FOR
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT

TABLE OF AUTHORITI

.................................................................................... ii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ................................................................................ 1
Nature of the Case ..................................................................................... 1
Statement of the Facts and
Course of Proceedings ............................................................................... 2
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL ..................................................................... 3
ARGUMENT ..........................................................................................................4
When It Denied Mr. Brook's Motion To
Suppress,
The Traffic Stop Was A Violation Of Mr. Brooks'
Constitutional Right To Be
From Unreasonable Searches and
Seizures
.....................................................................................4
A. Introduction

....................................................................................... 4

B. The Stop Was Not Justified Be Reasonable Suspicion At Its
Inception, Because Mr. Brooks Did Not Violate I.C. § 49-808(2) .......... 5
C. If I. C. § 49-808(2) Is Ambiguous, It Should Be Interpreted In Favor
Of Mr. Brooks Under The Rule Of Lenity ............................................ 15
D. Trooper Higley's Misapprehension of I. C. § 49-808(2) Was A
Mistake Of Law That Rendered The Stop Per Se Unreasonable ........ 21
CONCLUSION .................................................................................................... 29
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING ............................................................................... 30

Inns, Inc. v.
Idaho

or

' 1

................................................................................... 6, 12, 17

Brinegarv. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949) .................................................. 23
Bryan v. United States, [524 U.S. 184 (1998) ..................................................... 25
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U

648 (1979) ......................................................... ..

Farber v. Idaho State Ins. Fund, 147 Idaho 307 (2009) ...................................... 13
FilerMut. Tel. Co. v. Idaho

Comm'n,

Heien v. North Carolina, 1

Ct. 1

(1
(U

...................... 7, 8

Apr. 21, 2014) ....... ..........

·1,

Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797 (1971) ............................................................ ..
Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990) ......................................................... .
K Mart Corp. v. Idaho State Tax Commission, 111 Idaho 719 (1986) ....... 9, 10, 11
MacDonald v. Pan Am. 'vllorld Airways, Inc., 859 F.2d 742, 746 (9 1h Cir. 1988) .... 7
Mead v. Arnell, 117 Idaho 660 (1990) ................................................................. 25
Nava v. Rivas-DelToro, 151 Idaho 853, 858 n.3 & 860 (2011 .............................. 6
Office Max, Inc. v. United States, 428 F.3d 583 (6th Cir. 2005) ...................... 10, 11
Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690 (1996) ................................................... 23
Peacock v. Lubbock Compress Co., 252 F.2d 892 (5th Cir. 1958) ...................... 11
People v. Hanna, 800 N.E.2d 1201 (Ill. 2003) ..................................................... 10
People v. Broussard, 856 P.2d 1134 (Cal. 1993) ................................................ 10
State v. Alley, 155 Idaho 972, 318 P.3d 962 (Ct. App. 2014) ............ 16, 17, 18, 19
State v. Arregui, 44 Idaho 43 (1927) ...................................................................27
State v. Beck, 614 S.E. 274 (N.C. 2005) ............................................................. 16

ii

State v. Bradshaw, 155 Idaho 437 (Ct. App. 2013) .......................................... 16
v. Doe, 140 Idaho 271 (2004) ................................................................... 15
State v. Donato, 135 Idaho 469 (2001) ............................................................... 28
State v. Enking, 59 Idaho 321, 82 P.2d 649 (1938) ............................................... 9
State v. Flowers,

P.3d 476 (Wash. App. 2010) ............................................ 10

State v. Fox, 124 Idaho 924 (1993) ..................................................................... 26
v. Gamino, 148 Idaho 827 (Ct. App. 2010) ................................................. 6
State v. Goodlett, 139 Idaho 262 (Ct. App. 2003) ................................................. 9
v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981 (1992) ......................................................... ..
v. Hale, ·116 Idaho 763 (Ct. App. 1989) ..................................................... 16
State v. Heien, 737 S.E.2d 351 (N.C. 2012) ..................................................... 16
State v. Heien, 749 S.E.2d 278 (N.C. 20'13) ....................................................... 16
State v. Horton, 150 Idaho 300 (Ct. App. 2010) .................................................. 26
State v. Jones, 151 Idaho 943 (Ct. App. 2011) ................................................... 15
State v. Koivu, 152 Idaho 511 (2012) ............................................................ 27, 28
State v. Ramirez, 145 Idaho 886 (Ct. App. 2008) ............................................... 28
State v. Rhode, 133 Idaho 459 (1999) ................................................................ 15
State v. Rivera, 131 Idaho 8 (Ct. App. 1988) .................................................. 7, 18
State v. Schulz, 151 Idaho 863 (2011) ................................................................ 13
State v. Trusda/1, 155 Idaho 965 P.3d 955 (Ct. App. 2014) ................................. 16
State v. Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho 471 (2007) ......................................................... 7, 8
United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271 (11th Cir. 2003) .................. 24, 26
United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001) .................................................... 22

iii

United

v. Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d 110106 (9 1h Cir. 2000)...... .... ..... ... .

United

v. McDonald, 453

Cir. 2006) ........................... ..

United States v. Miller, 146 F.3d 274, 279 (5 1h Cir. 1998) ................................ .
United States v. Nicholson, 721 F.3d 1236 (1oth Cir. 2013) .......................... 23,
United States v. Orduna-Martinez, 561 F.3d 1134 n.2 (1oth Cir. 2009) ............ ..
United States v. Tibbetts, 396 F.3d 1132 (1 01h Cir. 2005) ............................. 22, 26
Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg'/ Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889 (2011) ............. passim

§ 18-201(1) ............................................................................................... .

§ 37-2705 ............................................................................................ 18, '19
§ 49-109(5)(b) ......................................................................................... '11
I.C.§49-117(1)

.......................................................................................... 11,

I.C. § 49-120(23) ................................................................................................. 11
I.C. § 49-664 ....................................................................................................... 16
I.C. § 49-808 ............................................................................................... passim
I.C. § 6-1607(2) .....................................................................................................6
I.C. § 63-3622 .......................................................................................................9
I.C. §§ 40-109(5)(b) ............................................................................................. 11
Ala. Code § 32-5A-133(b) ................................................................................... 19
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 42-4-903(2) ............................................................................ 20
21 Del. Code§ 4155(b) .......................................................................................20
Haw. Rev. Stat. § 291 C-84(b) ............................................................................. 19
Kan. Stat.§ 8-1548(b) ......................................................................................... 19

iv

Rev. Stat. § 189.380(2) ................................................................................. 19
La.

§

1

................................................................................. ..

N.D. Cent. Code§ 39-1 0<38(2) ........................................................................... 19
N.H. Rev. Stat.§ 265:45(2) ................................................................................. 19
N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law§ 1163(b) ......................................................................... 19
S.C. Code § 56-5-2150(b) ................................................................................... 19
Tex. Transp. Code.§ 545.104(b) ........................................................................ 19
26 U.S.C. § 4251 ................................................................................................ ·1 0
Utah Code § 41-6a-804(1 )(b) .............................................................................. 20
23Vt.

§1064(d) ..................................................................................... ..

Wash. Rev. Code§ 46.61.305(2) ........................................................................ 20
Wyo. Stat.§ 31-5-217(b) ..................................................................................... 20

Idaho Canst. Art. I, § 17 ......................................................................................27
Idaho Canst. Art. II, § 1 ................................................................................. 24, 25
Idaho Canst. Art Ill,§ 1 ....................................................................................... 24
Idaho Canst. Art. V, §§ 2 & 13 ............................................................................ 25

Other Provisions
1977 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 52, pp.370-71 ................................................... 16, 17
1988 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 265, pp.549-50 ....................................................... 17
Black's Law Dictionary 86 (6th ed. 1990) ......................................................... 6, 12

v

Matthew 0.

after being

while driving for supposedly failing to

signal in violation of Idaho Code § 49-808(2), was accused of committing felony
possession of a controlled substance.

He filed a motion to suppress all evidence

obtained by the State as a result of an unlawful search and seizure of Mr. Brooks and
his vehicle. At a hearing on the motion to suppress, Mr. Brooks asserted that the traffic
stop of his vehicle was unlawful because, although the stop had been based on
Mr.

supposed violation of
of that

conditional plea

49-808(2), he never actually committed a

district

the motion to suppress. Pursuant to a

preservin~J

right to appeal the denial of the motion to

suppress, Mr. Brooks then pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled substance. The
district court granted a withheld judgment and placed Mr. Brooks on probation for a
period of three years.
Mr. Brooks appealed, asserting that the district court erred when it denied his
motion to suppress because the stop was in violation of his constitutional right to be free
from unreasonable searches and seizures. His appeal centered on the issue of how
long one must signal a lane change while driving on a controlled-access highway.
In its Respondent's Brief, the State argued that Mr. Brooks did not show error in
the denial of his motion to suppress, because the district court correctly applied the law
to the facts in concluding that the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop Mr. Brooks
for violating Section 49-808(2), because Mr. Brooks did not signal for at least five
seconds before changing lanes, and even if Mr. Brooks did not violate Section 49-

1

808(2), the officer's mistake of
stop.

was objectively

and did not invalidate the

.)
This Reply Brief is necessary to clarify that the stop of Mr. Brooks was not

justified by reasonable suspicion at its inception, and that the officer's mistake of law
rendered the stop per se unreasonable.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Mr. Brooks' Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are
incorporated herein by reference thereto.

2

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr.
motion to su
traffic stop was in violation of Mr. Brooks' constitutional right
unreasonable searches and seizures?

3

the

ARGUMENT

Traffic StoQ Was In Violation Of Mr. Brooks' Constitutional Right To Be Free From
Unreasonable Searches And Seizures

A.

Introduction
Mr. Brooks asserts that the district court erred when it denied his motion to

suppress, because the traffic stop was in violation of his constitutional right to be free
from unreasonable searches and seizures. The stop was not justified at its inception
because, while Trooper Higley's sole reason for initiating the stop was his belief that
Mr. Brooks had committed a traffic violation by failing to signal a lane change for five
seconds, supposedly in violation of I.C. § 49-808(2), under the plain language of
Section 49-808(2) Mr. Brooks did not violate that statute.

I.C. § 49-808(2) is an

unambiguous statute requiring a five-second signal only when a driver is both on a
controlled-access highway and turning from a parked position. Because Mr. Brooks did
not violate Section 49-808(2), and Trooper Higley offered no other reason for initiating
the stop, the stop was not justified at its inception by reasonable suspicion.
Alternatively, if I.C. § 49-808(2) is ambiguous, it should be interpreted in favor of
Mr. Brooks under the rule of lenity. If the statute is interpreted in Mr. Brooks' favor, he
did not violate the statute and the stop was not justified by reasonable suspicion at its
inception. In any event, Trooper Higley's misapprehension of Section 49-808(2) was a
mistake of law that rendered the stop per se unreasonable.
Thus, the law requires that any evidence gathered as a result of the unlawful
traffic stop be suppressed. The district court therefore erred when it denied Mr. Brooks'
motion to suppress.

4

B.

Mr. Brooks Did Not Violate I. C. § 49-808(2)
that the stop was not justified by reasonable suspicion
inception, because he did not violate I.C. § 49-808(2).

its

Mr. Brooks did not violate

Section 49-808(2), because its plain and unambiguous language requires a signal of not
less than five seconds only where a vehicle driver is both on a controlled-access
highway and turning from a parked position.
Section 49-808(2) provides that:
f\ signal of intention to turn or move right or
given
warn
traffic.
turning from
continuously for not
than
(5)
not
than
one hundred (1 00)
turning.

I.C. § 49-808(2). The district court determined that Mr. Brooks violated I.C. § 49-808(2)
after interpreting the statute as requiring "that on controlled-access highways the signal
shall be given continuously for not less than five (5) seconds." (R., pp.85 & n.1, 88.)
"The interpretation of a statute must begin with the literal words of the statute;
those words must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning; and the statute
must be construed as a whole." Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg'/ Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho
889, 893 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). "If the statute is not ambiguous, this
Court does not construe it, but simply follows the law as written." /d. (internal quotation
marks omitted).
Mr. Brooks submits that the district court's interpretation of the statute ignores the
plain, usual, and ordinary meaning of the language of the statute, specifically the
provision that "[o]n controlled-access highways and before turning from a parked

5

continuously for
).

than five

plain,

mean

Inns, Inc. v. Pocatello-Chubbuck Auditorium or Cmty. Ctr.
(2008); In re Brink, 117 Idaho

' 1
Gamino, 148 Idaho

& n

(1990); State v.

830 (Ct. App. 201 0). According to the Idaho Supreme Court,

word 'and' is a 'conjunction connecting words or phrases expressing the idea that
latter is to be added to or taken along with the first."' Ameritellnns, Inc., 146 Idaho
(quoting Black's Law Dictionary 86 (6th ed. 1990)).
of

their plain,

, and ordinary meaning and construing the
ires a signal for not

as a whole,
if both: (1)

Thus, after giving the literal

than

giving the signal is on a controlled-access h

and

the person giving the signal is turning from a parked position. I.C. § 49-808(2).
The State argues that "interpreting the word 'and' in Section 49-808(2) in its
ordinarily understood conjunctive sense, and in the context of the entire statute,
supports the district court's conclusion that the five-second signal requirement applies
when a driver is moving right or left on a controlled-access highway and when he or she
is turning from a parked position, not that both circumstances need be present before
the five-second signal is required."

(Resp. Br., p.9.)

But by interpreting Section 49-

808(2) as having "two separate circumstances in which a five-second signal is required"
(Resp. Br., p.1 0), the State would give "and" a disjunctive meaning, rather than its plain,
usual, and ordinary conjunctive meaning. See Nava v. Rivas-Del Taro, 151 Idaho 853,
858 n.3 & 860 (2011) (stating, in a case involving the interpretation of I. C. § 6-1607(2),
that "the four circumstances in which the presumption of nonliability does not apply are

6

disjunctive. Therefore, if one of the circumstances
not apply. It is

the presumption

to find that all of the circumstances exist").

Put otherwise, the

would read the word "and" in the "[o]n controlled-access

turning from a parked position" part of the statute as the word
"or." 1 See

Mut. Tel.

v. Idaho Tax Comm'n, 76 Idaho

Rivera, 1311daho8, 10(Ct.

1 (1955);

v.

1988). This would go against the precept from

that "words must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning." Verska, 151 Idaho
at 893; see also MacDonald v. Pan Am. World Aitways, Inc., 859 F.2d 742, 746 (9 1h Cir.
1988) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) ("\J\Je give our language, and our language-dependent
legal

a body blow when we hold that it is reasonable to

'or' for 'and."').

cases cited by the State do not support the State's interpretation of
49-808(2). Contrary to the

argument (Resp. Br., p.9), State v. Yzaguirre, 1

Idaho 471 (2007), actually represents another example of Idaho's appellate courts
giving the word "and" its plain, usual, and ordinary meaning. In Yzaguirre, a party to the
litigation, not the Idaho Supreme Court as the State represents (see Resp. Br., p.9),
advanced the interpretation that the word "and" in the phrase "[t]o consider and advise
its legal representatives in pending litigation ... enumerates two separate purposes."

Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho at 475.

The Yzaguirre Court adopted an entirely different

interpretation, holding that the plain interpretation of the statute was that: "An executive

1

To the extent that the State argues that the word "and" in its "ordinarily understood
conjunctive sense" may be read as denoting "two separate circumstances" (see Resp.
Br., pp.9-1 0), that argument fails. "As a linguistic matter, 'and' and 'or' are not
synonyms; indeed, they are more nearly antonyms. One need only start the day with a
breakfast of ham or eggs to be duly impressed by the difference." MacDonald v. Pan
Am. World Aitways, Inc., 859 F.2d 742, 746 (9th Cir. 1988) (Kozinski, J., dissenting)
(emphasis in original).

7

session may be held: (1) to consider, and

its legal representatives in, pending

litigation; or (2) where there is a general public awareness of probable litigation." /d.
at 475-76.
Thus, the Yzaguirre Court used the plain, usual, and ordinary meaning of "and,"
to connect "consider" with "advise its legal representatives in" under one circumstance.
See id. at 4 76. The Court also held that "where there is general public awareness of

probable litigation . . . constitutes a separate and independent circumstance under
which executive sessions may be held." /d. Contrary to the State's argument that there
are two separate circumstances linked by "and" in the first part of the second sentence
of Section

49~808(2)

(see Resp.

, p.1 0), the two separate and independent

circumstances in the Yzaguirre statute were linked by a disjunctive "or," not a
conjunctive "and."

Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho at 476.

The Yzaguirre Court further rejected the State's argument that the word
"consider" in the first part of the statute should not be given its plain, usual, and ordinary
meaning. The State advocated its own interpretation of the statute that would allow a
governing body to "consider its legal representatives." !d. But the Court rejected that
interpretation: "The State's interpretation would read 'consider' to mean 'consult.'

It

strains the ordinary meaning of 'consider.' The result urged by the State cannot be
reconciled with the text of the statute." /d.

Thus, Yzaguirre actually undermines the

State's argument in this case that words such as "and" should not be given their plain,
usual, and ordinary meaning.
The State also notes that the Idaho Supreme Court at one point observed that
"'[t]he word 'and' in a statute may be read 'or,' and vice versa, whenever the change is

8

to

the statute sense and

evident
59 Idaho

or

of the

its different parts, or carry
13 (quoting

v. Enking,

1, 82 P.2d 649, 661 (1 938).) However, Enking predates the Idaho Supreme

Court's decision in Verska.

As discussed above, the Verska Court held that: 'The

interpretation of a statute must begin with the literal words of the statute; those words
must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning; and the statute must be
construed as a whole."

Verska, 151 Idaho at 893 (internal quotation marks omitted).

The Verska Court also rejected "the contention that we could revise an unambiguous
statute because we believed it was absurd or would produce absurd results .... " /d. at
896. Thus, to the

that Enking conflicts with Verska through permitting

to

not be given their plain, usual and ordinary meaning, or through permitting the revision
here) to give them "sense and effect,"

of unambiguous statutes (like the one

i.e., to avoid absurdity or absurd results, Verska would control as the more recent Idaho
Supreme Court opinion. 2 See State v. Goodlett, 139 Idaho 262, 265 (Ct. App. 2003)
(holding that, in the event of a conflict between two opinions, the more recent opinion
controls with respect to any conflict between them).
Nor does K Mart Corp. v. Idaho State Tax Commission, 111 Idaho 719 (1986),
support the State's argument that "and" should be read as "or" in this case. While the
Idaho Supreme Court in K Mart interpreted the word "and" in I.C. § 63-3622 as
indicating that the "statute exempts two types of tangible personal property," id. at 721,

2

The State cites cases from other jurisdictions in support of its use of Enking. (Resp.
Br., p.13.) However, unlike Idaho after the Verska decision, those jurisdictions allow a
court to depart from the literal interpretation of the language of an unambiguous statute
to avoid "absurd results." See State v. Beck, 614 S.E. 274, 277 (N.C. 2005); People v.
9

that decision also predated Verska.

Again,

holds

"words must be given

their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning." Verska, 151 Idaho at 893 (internal quotation
marks omitted).

Thus, to the extent that K Mart conflicts with Verska, Verska would

control. See Goodlett, 139 Idaho at 265.
Even if the departure from the plain, usual, and ordinary meaning of "and" in

K Mart remains valid after Verska, that departure only came about because of the
mutually exclusive nature of the two types of property exempted.
111 Idaho at 721-22.

See K Mart Corp.,

Specifically, the two types of property were "the property that

becomes a component part of property sold at retail and property used or consumed in
the production of property sold

retail." /d. at 721. The two types of property were

mutually exclusive because property that became a component part of property sold
retail could not also be property used or consumed in the production of property sold at
retail, or vice versa. See id.; id. at 724 (Bakes, J., dissenting) (contrasting advertising
inserts as a component of a newspaper from the ink and paper used in the production of
the newspaper).
Some other jurisdictions have recognized that, while "and" almost always takes
on its plain, usual, and ordinary conjunctive meaning, 3 in rare instances it may be read
as having a disjunctive meaning because it links two mutually exclusive concepts. See

OfficeMax, Inc. v. United States, 428 F.3d 583, 588 (6th Cir. 2005) (discussing 26 U.S.C.

§ 4251, which "defines 'communications services' as 'local telephone service, toll

Hanna, 800 N.E.2d 1201, 1207 (Ill. 2003); People v. Broussard, 856 P.2d 1134,1136
1993); State v. Flowers, 225 P.3d 476,478 (Wash. App. 2010).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in OfficeMax, Inc. v. United
States, 428 F.3d 583 (6th Cir. 2005), stated that "dictionary definitions, legal usage
~Cal.

10

and teletypewriter exchange

telephone

or cumulative sense

"as using

definitions of the

mutually exclusive and because no

in

§

in a disjunctive
are generally

that can satisfy all three definitions

once" (emphasis in original)); Peacock v. Lubbock Compress Co.,

892, 893

Cir. 1958) (interpreting a provision referring to "an employer engaged in ... the
ginning and compression of cotton" as disjunctive, because "compressing is an
operation entirely removed from ginning and ... the two are never carried on together").
Thus, because the two types of property exempted by the statute in K Mart were
mutually exclusive,

K

this narrow exception the Court could read "and" as "or."

Corp., 111 Idaho at 721
In contrast to the two exemptions in the K

exclusive about the

there is nothing mutually

phrases in the part of Section 49-808(2) outlining the five-

second requirement. A vehicle could be both "[oJn a controlled-access highway" and
"before turning from a parked position."

4

For example, a vehicle could be halted on the

shoulder of a controlled-access highway while not loading or unloading property or
passengers.

Under the statutory definitions, such a vehicle would be both "[o]n a

controlled-access highway" and "before turning from a parked position." See I.C. §§ 40109(5)(b); 49-117(1 ). Thus, K Mart does not support the State's argument that "and" in
Section 49-808(2) should be read as "or," because there is nothing mutually exclusive

guides and case law compel us to start from the premise that 'and' usually does not
mean 'or."' OfficeMax, Inc., 428 F.3d at 588.
4
See I. C. I. C. § 49-1 09(5)(b) ("defining "controlled-access highway"); I. C. § 49-117(1)
(defining "park" or "parking" as "the standing of a vehicle, whether occupied or not, other
than temporarily for the purpose of and while actually engaged in loading or unloading
property or passengers"); I.C. § 49-120(23) (defining "stand" or "standing" as "the
11

about a vehicle being both "[o]n a controlled-access highway" and "before turning from a
position."
The State's "grammatical" argument is also unavailing.

The State attempts to

distinguish the cases where Idaho's appellate courts have used the plain, usual, and
ordinary meaning of "and" from this case on the basis that the statutes in the prior cases
used "and" to "join together items in a conjunctive list" or "two unmodified verbs," while
the statute here uses "and" to "join[] together two independent prepositional phrases."
(Resp. Br., pp.1 0-11.)

But the State's so-called "strict grammatical reading of the

statute" (Resp. Br., p.1 0), ignores the plain, usual, and ordinary meaning of "and." As
the

Supreme Court held, 'The word 'and' is a 'conjunction connecting
the

that the latter is to

first."' Ameritel Inns, Inc., 1

added

or

or taken along with the

Idaho at 205 (quoting Black's Law Dictionary

(6 111

1990)) (emphasis added). Nothing in Idaho's jurisprudence on statutory interpretation
precludes the use of the word "and" to link two phrases, prepositional or otherwise.
Thus, given its plain, usual, and ordinary meaning, "and" connects the two phrases in
the first part of the second sentence of Section 49-808(2) and expresses the idea that
the latter phrase is to be added to or taken along with the first phrase. See id.
Additionally, the State's argument that the plain interpretation of Section 49808(2) advocated by Mr. Brooks would "render portions of the statute superfluous"
(Resp. Br., p.13), fails.

The State contends that under the plain interpretation of the

statute, where "the five-second signal requirement ... only applies to drivers who are
both 'on controlled-access highways' and 'turning from a parked position,' the 'or move

halting of a vehicle, whether occupied or not, otherwise than temporarily for the purpose
12

right or left' language contained in the first sentence of the
Br., p.14.)

Verska

be

no

This argument also ignores the Idaho Supreme Cou

. In Verska, the Court observed that "effect must be given to all the

of the statute if possible, so that none will be void, superfluous, or redundant."

Verska, 151 Idaho at 897 (internal quotation marks omitted).

But the Verska Court

further stated that "the statute must be construed as a whole." /d. at 893. In another
recent case, the Idaho Supreme Court stated, "Provisions should not be read in
isolation, but must be interpreted in the context of the entire document."

Schulz, 151

863, 866 (20 11) (quoting Farber v. Idaho

State v.

Ins. Fund, 14 7 Idaho

307,310
argument

the plain interpretation of I.C. § 49-808(2) would

render parts of the statute superfluous ignores those above

Section 49-

808(2) mandates how long or for what distance a signal must be given "when required."
I. C. § 49-808(2).

The "when required" language refers to Section 49-808(1 ), which

governs when a signal is required: "No person shall turn a vehicle onto a highway or
move a vehicle right or left upon a highway or merge onto or exit from a highway unless
and until the movement can be made with reasonable safety nor without giving an
appropriate signal." I. C. § 49-808(1 ). Thus, the plain interpretation of Section 49-808(2)
would not render any part of the statute superfluous, because persons would still be
required to signal as required in Section 49-808(1) and (2).
Under the plain, usual, and ordinary meaning of the language of I. C. § 49-808(2),
a five-second signal must be given only when the person giving the signal is both (1) on

of and while actually engaged in receiving or discharging passengers").
13

a

turning from a parked position. I

h

"[l]n all other
(1

given "for not less than the

traveled

one hundred

turning." !d. This interpretation of

49-

is the only

interpretation of the language of the statute, and thus the

is unambiguous.

Verska, 151 Idaho at 893,

By interpreting

statute so as

require a five-second signal when

person

giving the signal is only "[o]n a controlled-access highway," the State, much like the
district court, ignores the plain, usual,

ordinary meaning of the language of Section

49-808(2). Interpreting the word "and" in the phrase "[o]n controlled-access highways
turning from a parked
usual, and ord
surgery" on

117 Idaho

a disjunctive

" rather than

the

conjunctive meaning of "and," would be prohibited "open
"[h]ealthy

of an unambiguous statute.

Brink,

56-57.

Under the plain interpretation of I.C. § 49-808(2), Mr. Brooks did not commit a
violation of the statute. When Mr. Brooks made the lane change, he was not both (1) on
a controlled-access highway and (2) turning from a parked position, and thus he was
not required by I.C. § 49-808(2) to signal for not less than five seconds.

In fact,

Mr. Brooks complied with the "all other instances" language of Section 49-808(2),
because he signaled for approximately 160 feet.

(See R., p.85 & n.1.) Mr. Brooks

therefore did not violate I. C. § 49-808(2).
Because Mr. Brooks did not violate I.C. § 49-808(2), Trooper Higley did not have
a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify initiating the traffic stop. Trooper
Higley testified that the sole reason for the stop was because Mr. Brooks had violated
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49-808(2) by

signaling for five

Without the violation of

the trooper had no grounds for initiating the stop.

49-

Thus, the stop was not

justified by reasonable suspicion at its inception.
C.

If I.C. § 49-808(2) Is Ambiguous, It Should Be Interpreted In Favor Of Mr. Brooks
Under The Rule Of Lenity
Should this Court disagree with Mr. Brooks' assertion that I.C. § 49-808(2) is

unambiguous and instead determine that the

is ambiguous, Mr. Brooks asserts

that Section 49-808(2) should be interpreted in his favor under the rule of lenity. If the
statute is interpreted in Mr. Brooks' favor,
not justified by reasonable suspicion
is

"A

construction."

did not violate the statute and the stop was

its inception.

where the
151 Idaho

is

of more than one

896. When an appellate court must

engage in statutory construction because of an ambiguity in a statute, "it has the duty to
ascertain the legislative intent, and give effect to that intent." State v. Rhode, 133 Idaho
459, 462 (1999).

"To ascertain the intent of the legislature, not only must the literal

words of the statute be examined, but also the context of those words, the public policy
behind the statute and its legislative history." /d. Constructions of an ambiguous statute
that would lead to absurd results are disfavored.

See State v. Doe, 140 Idaho 271,

275 (2004).
However, "where the ambiguity exists as to the elements of or potential sanctions
for a crime, this Court will strictly construe the statute in favor of the defendant." /d. at
274.

"The rule of lenity requires that ambiguous criminal statutes should be read

narrowly and be construed in favor of the defendant." State v. Jones, 151 Idaho 943,
94 7 (Ct. App. 2011 ). "[T]his rule does not require a court to disregard the purpose of a
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statute when it is clear from the context." /d. (citing State v. Hale, 116 Idaho 763, 766
(Ct. App. 1989)). The Idaho Court of Appeals recently clarified that "where a review of
the legislative history makes the meaning of the statute clear, the rule of lenity will not
be applied." State v. Alley, 155 Idaho 972, 318 P.3d 962, 966 (Ct. App. 2014) (citing
State v. Bradshaw, 155 Idaho 437, 440 (Ct. App. 2013); Jones, 151 Idaho at 947). "If

the ambiguity remains after examining the text, context, history, and policy of the
statute, the interpretative tie between the two or more reasonable readings is resolved
in favor of the defendant." State v. Trusda/1, 155 Idaho 965, 318 P.3d 955, 959 (Ct.
App. 2014) (citing Bradshaw, 155 Idaho at 440-41). 5
If I.C. § 49-808(2) is ambiguous, the rule of lenity is applicable

The

ambiguity remains even after an examination of the legislative history, text, context, and
policy of the statute. See Trusda/1, 155ldaho 965,318 P.3d at 959.
The legislative history does not make the meaning of Section § 49-808(2) clear.
While the State's argument does not address the legislative history of the statute (see
Resp. Br., pp.15-19), Idaho's appellate courts have identified legislative history as a
factor in interpreting ambiguous statutes. Rhode, 133 Idaho at 462; Alley, 155 Idaho
972, 318 P.3d at 966. The legislative history here does not clarify the meaning of the
statute. Section 49-808(2) was initially enacted as part of former I.C. § 49-664. See
1977 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 52, pp.370-71. The preface to the bill passed by the Idaho
Legislature to enact former Section 49-664 stated: "An act providing a recodification and
revision of Chapters 5, 6, and 7, Title 49, Idaho Code, the rules of the road for motor
vehicles ... amending Title 49, Idaho Code, by the addition of a new Chapter 6, Title

5

At the time the Appellant's Brief was filed, the parties did not have the benefit of the
16

Idaho

. . providing regulations for turning and starting and signals on

stopping and turning . . . . "

1977 Idaho

ch.

This general

of legislative intent provides no insight into the intended meaning of the
statute, or into the intended meaning of "and" with respect to the five-second signal
requirement. See Alley, 155 Idaho 972, 318 P.3d at 968-69.
The preface to the bill passed by the Legislature to amend the statute

to its

current designation of I.C. § 49-808 is also of little assistance, as it stated: "An act
relating to recodification of the motor vehicle laws ... amending Sections ... 49-661
through 49-666 ... to redesignate the sections and to
Laws, ch.

pp.549-550.

recodification." 1

Idaho

Again, this general statement of legislative intent

not clarify the meaning of Section 49-808(2) or indicate the intended meaning of
"and" in the statute.

See Alley, 155 Idaho 972, 318 P.3d at 968-69.

Thus, the

legislative history does not clarify the purpose of the statute or make its meaning clear.
'Turning to the surrounding text and context in which the term was used," see id.,
the text and context, if anything, supports Mr. Brooks' interpretation of Section 49808(2). The context of the part of the statute at issue here includes I. C. § 49-808(1 ),
which governs when a signal is required. Subsection (1) includes the term "and" in the
phrase "unless and until," using it in its plain, usual, and ordinary meaning to connect
two words. See A me rite/ Inns, Inc., 146 Idaho at 205. Thus, the context indicates that
"and" in the part of (2) at issue here is also used with its plain, usual, and ordinary
meaning. See Alley, 155 Idaho 972, 318 P.3d at 969 (determining the meaning of the

Alley and Trusdal/ decisions.
17

ambiguous term

in one part of I.C. § 37-2705 by reading the whole statute at

including another part of Section 37-2705 where "athyl" also appeared).
Further, Section 49-808('1) features several uses of the word "or" to designate
that each circumstance described in that part of the statute is a separate circumstance
when a signal is required. See Filer Mut. Tel. Co., 76 Idaho at 261; Rivera, 131 Idaho
·1 0. Had the legislature intended for the first part of the second sentence of Section 49-

808(2) to similarly demarcate two separate circumstances requiring a five-second
signal, it would have used "or" to designate the two phrases in the first part as separate
circumstances as it did with the separate circumstances in Section 49-808(1 ), rather
than

the two

with "and." Thus, if anything, the surrounding

and

context of Section 49-808(2) supports Mr. Brooks' interpretation.
The policy of I.C. § 49-808(2)

not clarify the meaning of the word "and" in

the part of the statute at issue, or the meaning of the statute. The State argues that
"[t]he obvious purpose of I. C. § 49-808(2) is to promote the safety of motorists traveling
on Idaho's highways." (Resp. Br., p.15.) According to the State, its interpretation of the
statute should control because it better facilitates that purpose than the plain
interpretation. (See Resp. Br., pp.15-16.)

But even if the policy behind Section 49-

808(2) is motorist safety, it does not follow that the policy clarifies the meaning of the
statute.

A reasonable interpretation does not clarify the meaning of an ambiguous

statute just because it would be more comprehensive than another reasonable
interpretation when it comes to addressing an underlying policy of the statute.

See

Alley, 155 Idaho 972, 318 P.3d at 964-69 (holding that the rule of lenity applied to
exclude the chemical AM-2201 from the list of chemicals expressly enumerated in I.C.
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§ 37-2705(d)(30)(ii)(a),

even

though

including

the

chemical

under

a

comprehensive interpretation would arguably reflect the legislative intent

more
ban all

chemicals used in spice that mimic the effects of marijuana, including AM-2201 ,"
because the ambiguity in the term "alkyl" was unresolved "by the surrounding text,
context, or legislative history of the statute"). Thus, the policy of Section 49-808(2) does
not make the meaning of the statute clear.
Because any ambiguity in the meaning of Section 49-808(2) or in the meaning of
the word "and" in the statute is not resolved by the statute's legislative history,
surrounding text, context, or policy, the rule of lenity applies. See Alley, 1
318 P.3d at
imposed.

Further, no

Idaho 972,

would result if Mr. Brooks' interpretation were

id., 318 P.3d at 969. Contrary to the State's argument (see Resp. Br.,

pp.15-18), the plain interpretation would not lead to absurd results.

As discussed

above, the State's argument that Mr. Brooks' interpretation would allow drivers to turn
without giving any signal (see Resp. Br., p.17) ignores Section 49-808(1) of the statute.
Drivers would still be required to signal according to Section 49-808(1) and (2).
Additionally, Mr. Brooks' interpretation does not lead to absurd results because it
would require a signal of 100 feet for motorists driving on controlled-access highways
(see Resp. Br., pp.17-18), considering many other jurisdictions have a universal 100

feet signal requirement for a// turns or movements upon a roadway. 6 While the State

6

See, e.g., Ala. Code § 32-5A-133(b) ("A signal of intention to turn right or left when
required shall be given continuously during not less than the last 100 feet traveled by
the vehicle before turning."); Haw. Rev. Stat.§ 291C-84(b) (substantially the same, but
with special provisions for bicycles and mopeds); Kan. Stat. § 8-1548(b) (substantially
the same as Alabama, but containing "turn or move" language); Ky. Rev. Stat.
§ 189.380(2); N.D. Cent. Code§ 39-10-38(2); N.H. Rev. Stat.§ 265:45(2); N.Y. Veh. &
Traf. Law § 1163(b); S.C. Code § 56-5-2150(b); Tex. Transp. Code. § 545.1 04(b); 23
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argues that Mr.
results" (Resp. Br.,

interpretation of Section 49-808(2) would
pp.17~18),

"perverse

the statutes in those other jurisdictions indicate that a

100 feet signal requirement is widely

to promote motorist safety.

Following

the State's argument (see Resp. Br., p.16), Section 49-808(2) would actually enhance
motorist safety when compared to a universal 100 feet signal requirement, because it
would give motorists more notice and time to react in the vulnerable circumstance
where a vehicle is turning on a controlled-access highway from a parked position. 7
Motorists turning from a parked position while not on a controlled-access
highway would still be required to signal according to Section 49-808(1 ). See I. C. § 49808(1) ("1\Jo person shall turn a vehicle onto a highway or move a vehicle right or left
upon a highway . . . without giving an appropriate signal.")

In sum,

Brooks'

interpretation would not lead to any absurdity or absurd results.
Thus, if this Court determines that I.C. § 49-808(2) is ambiguous, the statute
should be interpreted in favor of Mr. Brooks under the rule of lenity. If Section 49-808(2)

Vt. Stat.§ 1064(d); Wash. Rev. Code§ 46.61.305(2); Wyo. Stat.§ 31-5-217(b); cf. La.
Rev. Stat. § 32:104 (requiring a 100-foot signal for a turn "which will take [a] vehicle
from the highway it is then traveling"); Utah Code § 41-6a-804(1 )(b) ("A signal of
intention to turn right or left or to change lanes shall be given continuously for at least
the last two seconds preceding the beginning of the movement.").
But see Colo. Rev. Stat. § 42-4-903(2) (requiring that a signal be given "for at
least two hundred feet on all four-lane highways and other highways where the prima
facie or posted speed limit is more than forty miles per hour"); 21 Del. Code§ 4155(b)
("A signal of intention to turn or move right or left when required shall be given
continuously during not less than the last 300 feet or more than Yz mile traveled by the
vehicle before turning."); Ill. Camp. Stat. 5/11-804(b) (requiring a 200-foot signal "before
turning outside a business or residence district").
7
Contrary to the prosecutor's contention before the district court that "[d]rivers do not
'park' on a freeway," (see Resp. Br., pp.16-17), a person could be "parked" on a
controlled-access highway under the statutory definition if "they break down, pull over
and stop or run out of gas." See I.C. § 49-117(1).
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in Mr.

is

he did

the

and the stop was not

justified by reasonable suspicion at its inception.
D.

No matter whether I.C. § 49-808(2) is unambiguous or ambiguous, Mr. Brooks
did not commit a violation of the statute. As discussed above, Trooper Higley's sole
reason for the stop was his belief that Mr. Brooks had violated the statute, based on his
misapprehension of I.C. § 49-808(2).

Mr. Brooks asserts that Trooper Higley's

misapprehension of I.C. § 49-808(2) was a mistake of law, and his mistake of law
rendered the
Mr.

per se unreasonable.

that an officer's

of

a detention

se unreasonable, i.e., invalidate a search or

Resp. Br., p.20), this is the approach taken by

majority of

courts that have directly addressed the issue. (See App. Br., pp.21

federal and state
) A minority of

those courts have taken the other approach, holding that an officer's mistake of law, like
a mistake of fact, can be objectively reasonable. (See App. Br., pp.22-23.)
Mr. Brooks submits that this Court should adopt the majority approach and hold
that an officer's mistake of law renders a detention per se unreasonable. The State
argues that this Court instead should adopt the minority approach. 8 (Resp. Br., pp.21-

8

The State's arguments for the minority approach rely in large part on the North
Carolina Supreme Court's decision in State v. Heien, 737 S.E.2d 351 (N.C. 2012). (See
Resp. Br., pp.20-25.) However, the United States Supreme Court has granted certiorari
in the Heien case. State v. Heien, 749 S.E.2d 278 (N.C. 2013), cert. granted, Heien v.
North Carolina, 134 S. Ct. 1872 (U.S. Apr. 21, 2014) (No. 13-604). The question
presented is: "Whether a police officer's mistake of law can provide the individualized
suspicion that the Fourth Amendment requires to justify a traffic stop." See Petition for
21

) But the State's arguments only provide further grounds for why this

rt should

adopt the majority approach.
Only the majority approach fulfills the reasonableness requirement of

Fourth

Amendment. "The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness." United

States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118 (2001 ). The legal justification for a detention "must
be objectively grounded," United States v. Miller, 146 F.3d 274, 279 (5ih Cir. 1998), and
a detention based on a mistake of law is not objectively grounded or objectively
reasonable. See United States v. McDonald, 453 F.3d 958, 961 (ih Cir. 2006); United

States v. Tibbetts, 396 F.3d 1132, 1138 (1oth Cir. 2005).
As articulated by the

the minority approach merely pays lip service to the

reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment.

The State notes

Br.,

p.25), that the United States Supreme Court has held that the Fourth Amendment
not require "factual accuracy." See 1//inois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 185 (1990). "[l]n
order to satisfy the 'reasonableness' requirement of the Fourth Amendment, what is
generally demanded of the many factual determinations that must regularly be made by
agents of the government ... is not that they always be correct, but that they always be
reasonable."

/d. (emphasis added).

In the context of factual mistakes, "sufficient

probability, not certainty, is the touchstone of reasonableness under the Fourth
Amendment." See Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 803-04 (1971 ).

Because officers

may encounter ambiguous situations, "room must be allowed for some mistakes on their
part.

But the mistakes must be those of reasonable men, acting on facts leading

a Writ of Certiorari, Heien v. North Carolina, No. 13-604 (Nov. 13, 2013), 2013 WL
6091788 at *i.
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their conclusions of probability." Brinegar v. United
1

(1

u .1

(emphasis added).
However, the same constitutional standard that allows for mistakes of fact to

reasonable does not allow for mistakes of law to be reasonable. After the determination
of historical facts, the reasonable suspicion analysis involves a mixed question of law
and fact: "The historical facts are admitted or established, the rule of law is undisputed,
and the issue is whether the facts satisfy the relevant statutory or constitutional
standard, or to put it another way, whether the rule of law as applied to the established
facts is or is not violated."

Ornelas v. United States, 517 U

(emphasis added) (internal quotation marks

690, 696-97 (1

alterations omitted). Thus, the

whether the law was violated, not whether an officer's mistaken conception of
the law was violated. See id.
"The relevant question, in a case such as this one, is: Against what interpretation
of the law should we assess the facts when deciding whether there was reasonable
suspicion ... to make a traffic stop?" United States v. Nicholson, 721 F.3d 1236, 1244
(1 0 1h Cir. 2013). The minority approach would "require courts to assess whether there
are ... any incorrect (but reasonable) interpretations of our laws that might justify the
government's assertion that an officer had observed sufficient facts to establish
reasonable suspicion." See id. at 1244 n.8. But Orne/as forecloses this requirement,
because the reasonable suspicion analysis involves "whether the rule of law as applied
to the established facts is or is not violated." See Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 696-97. The
majority approach is in accord with Orne/as, because it "judge[s] the facts against the
correct interpretation of the law, as opposed to any other interpretation, even if arguably
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a reasonable one.

See Nicholson,

1 F.3d

1244. Thus, only the majority approach

fulfills the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment.
The majority approach maintains the separation of powers between the three
departments of Idaho's government. Idaho's government is "divided into three distinct
departments, the legislative, executive and judicial; and no person or collection of
persons charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these
departments shall exercise any powers properly belonging to either of the others,
except as in this constitution expressly directed or permitted." Idaho Canst. Art. II, § 1.
The minority approach favored by the State would threaten the separation of powers.
Law enforcement officers, as part of the executive branch, would essentially usurp the
lawmaking powers of the legislature under the minority approach,

validating

detentions based on mistakes of law due to any sort of ambiguity in a statute would
"sweep behavior into the statute which the authors of the statute may have had in mind
but failed to put into the plain language of the statute."

See United States v.

Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271, 1278 (11th Cir. 2003); Idaho Canst. Art Ill,§ 1.
While the State did not directly address the separation of powers issue (see
Resp. Br., pp.19-27), it touched upon another way the minority approach would threaten
the separation of powers.

According to the State, the majority approach involves

"[p]reventing officers from reasonably interpreting the laws upon which they base traffic
stops." (See Resp. Br., p.24.) Thus, the State suggests that officers would be allowed
to interpret the laws they enforce under the minority approach. (See Resp. Br., pp.2324.) However, the State also admits that "law enforcement officers are charged with
enforcing the law, not deciding its precise scope." (Resp. Br., p.24.) Indeed, it is the
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the judicial branch, not
Constitution
is

all judicial

executive branch, to interpret the law. The Idaho
and jurisdiction in the Idaho Supreme Court, and it

that it is the duty of the Court

interpret the law." Mead v. Arnell, 117 Idaho

660,669 (1990); see Idaho Canst. Art II,§ 1, Art. V, §§ 2 & 13.
By permitting officers to interpret the very laws they are charged with enforcing,
the minority approach advocated by the State would have the executive department
usurp not only the role of the legislature but also that of the judiciary. Thus, the minority
approach would threaten the separation of powers. In contrast, the majority approach
maintains the separation of powers, properly leaving it to the legislature to make the law
and the courts to interpret the law.

Idaho Canst. Art. II, § 1.

Additionally, the majority approach treats officers and citizens with fundamental
fairness. "As a rule, if a defendant is presumed to know the law, we must

as

much from law enforcement." United States v. Orduna-Martinez, 561 F .3d 1134, 1137
n.2 (1oth Cir. 2009). Conversely, the minority approach treats officers and citizens with
fundamental unfairness. While, on the one hand, the minority approach elevates law
enforcement officers into a position where they can make and interpret the laws they
are charged with enforcing, on the other hand, the minority approach contends that
"officers are not trained in the intricacies of the substantive law and, as such, cannot be
expected to interpret the traffic laws with the subtlety and expertise of a criminal
defense attorney." (Resp. Br., p.23 (internal quotation marks omitted).) The idea that
officers who are ignorant of the law should be allowed to interpret the law illustrates "the
fundamental unfairness of holding citizens to 'the traditional rule that ignorance of the
law is no excuse,' Bryan v. United States, [524 U.S. 184, 196 (1998)], while allowing
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'entrusted to enforce' the law to

ignorant of it."

Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d

1

Although the

contends that the minority approach is more consistent

because it "allows reviewing courts to treat all police mistakes the same" (see Resp. Sr.,
p.25 (internal quotations omitted)), the fundamental unfairness of allowing law
enforcement officers to be ignorant of the law while not providing a similar privilege to
citizens shows that the minority approach suffers from a basic inconsistency.

In

contrast, the majority approach treats mistakes by law enforcement officers and citizens
consistently. Under the majority approach, an officer's mistake of law would not justify a
, much like a
Tibbetts,

F.3d at 1138;

ignorance

the

would not serve as a defense. See

v. Fox, 124 Idaho 924, 926 (1 993) ("Ignorance of the

law is not a defense."). Conversely, an officer's reasonable mistake of fact could justify
a detention, just as a citizen's reasonable mistake of fact could serve as a defense.
See State v. Horton, 150 Idaho 300, 302 (Ct. App. 2010); I. C. § 18-201 (1) (providing

that the class of persons who acted "under an ignorance or mistake of fact which
disproves any criminal intent" are not capable of committing crimes).
Further, the minority approach would not even achieve what the State purports it
would accomplish: not all police mistakes in Idaho would be treated the same. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has adopted the majority approach,
holding that an officer's good-faith but mistaken belief that a motorist committed a traffic
violation does not justify a stop under the Fourth Amendment. United States v. LopezSoto, 205 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2000). Thus, under the minority approach a mistake

of law by an Idaho law enforcement officer would not justify a stop in federal court, but it
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could in
to treating

Not only would the minority
as opposed to citizens, it

be inconsistent when it came
inconsistent when it came to

police mistakes. The majority approach rightfully avoids these inconsistencies.
Finally, the majority approach preserves Idaho's exclusionary rule. The majority
approach preserves Idaho's exclusionary rule both through providing an incentive for
police to properly understand the law, see Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d at 1106, and through
precluding a "good-faith" exception to Idaho's exclusionary rule.
Although the State does not directly argue for it as such (see Resp. Br., pp.2223), the minority approach is tantamount to a good-faith exception to Idaho's
exclusionary rule.

Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d

1106. As the State acknowledges
a good-faith exception to the

exclusionary rule under Article I, § ·17
Idaho 511 (2012); State v. Guzman, 1

the Idaho Constitution.
Idaho 981 (1 992).

v. Koivu, 152

To the extent that the

minority approach would conflict with the Idaho Supreme Court's recent decision in

Koivu, the minority approach should be rejected.
Contrary to the State's argument (see Resp. Br., p.23), Idaho's exclusionary rule
is not based on the level of the intrusion into an individual's privacy. For example, Koivu
explained that, in the earlier decision State v. Arregui, 44 Idaho 43 (1 927), "the Court
made it clear that the evidence unlawfully obtained should be excluded simply because
it was obtained in violation of the defendant's constitutional rights." Koivu, 152 Idaho at
488 (citing Arregui, 44 Idaho at 57-58). Justice Bistline, the author of Guzman, 9 stated:

9

The Court in Koivu noted that a majority of the Guzman Court "rejected the good-faith
exception, but a majority did not agree upon the reasons for doing so." Koivu, 152
Idaho at 518.
27

[T]he exclusionary rule should
applied in order to: 1) provide an
effective remedy to persons who have been subjected to an unreasonable
government search and/or
2) deter the police from acting
unlawfully in obtaining evidence; 3) encourage thoroughness in the
warrant issuing process; 4) avoid having the judicial commit an additional
constitutional violation by considering evidence which has been obtained
through illegal means; and 5) preserve judicial integrity.

Guzman, 122 Idaho at 993.

None of the above cases couched the basis for the

exclusionary rule in terms of only covering, as the State suggests, the most "inherently
invasive" searches.

(See Resp. Br., p.23.) Rather, "Idaho had clearly developed an

exclusionary rule as a constitutionally mandated remedy for illegal searches and
seizures in addition to other purposes behind the rule such as recognizing the
exclusionary rule as a deterrent for police misconduct."

v. Donato, 135 Idaho

4 72 (2001 ). Idaho's exclusionary rule is not based on the level of the intrusion into an
individual's privacy.
The State also minimizes the level of intrusion inherent in a traffic stop. (See
Resp. Br., pp.22-23).

"Although a vehicle stop is limited in magnitude compared to

other types of seizures, it is nonetheless a 'constitutionally cognizable' intrusion and
therefore may not be conducted 'at the unbridled discretion of law enforcement
officials.'" State v. Ramirez, 145 Idaho 886, 889 (Ct. App. 2008) (quoting Delaware v.

Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661 (1979)).

Idaho's exclusionary rule "is a judicially created

remedy for searches and seizures that violate the Constitution." Koivu, 152 Idaho at
518.

Because a traffic stop is a constitutionally cognizable intrusion, Idaho's

exclusionary rule is available as a remedy for illegal traffic stops. See Koivu, 152 Idaho
at 518; Donato, 1351daho at472.
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In its

Koivu

, the

not shown any

Court

overruling

that

and holding

exception to the exclusionary rule applies to violations of Article I, section 17 of the
Idaho Constitution." Koivu, 1

Idaho at 511-1

Similarly, the State has not shown

any ground here for adopting the minority approach as a good-faith exception to Idaho's
exclusionary rule. The majority approach preserves Idaho's exclusionary rule.
The majority approach, because it fulfills the reasonableness requirement of the
Fourth Amendment while maintaining separation of powers, treating officers and
citizens with fundamental fairness, and preserving Idaho's exclusionary rule, should
adopted

this Court.

unreasonable.

Thus,

An officer's

law renders a detention

11igley's misapprehension of I.

§ 49-808(2) was a

mistake of law, and his mistake of law rendered the stop per se unreasonable.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, as well as the reasons contained in the Appellant's Brief,
Mr. Brooks respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's order of
probation on withheld judgment, reverse the district court's order denying the motion to
suppress, and remand the case to the district court for further proceedings.
DATED this 1ih day of June, 2014.

BEN P. MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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